









This  paper  investigates  a  rational  dynamic  stochastic  general  equilibrium 
model with a stockout constraint and a production chain. Our model shows 
that  both  stockout  avoidance  and  cost  shock mechanisms  replicate  stylised 
inventory  facts  ‐‐  production  is  more  volatile  than  sales  and  inventory 
investment  is  procyclical.  In  addition,  production  smoothing  also works  at 
very  high  frequencies. Note  that  the  cost  shock  and  production  smoothing 
mechanisms  are  naturally  embedded  in  our  micro‐founded  general 
equilibrium  framework.  Moreover,  as  a  by‐product,  the  production  chain 
causes  the  slow  adjustment  of  inventories  in  aggregate. Consequently,  our 
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Inventories are important in understanding business cycles. Inventory investment ac-
counts for a large share of GDP uctuations, especially during recessions.1 Despite this
importance, most existing theoretical studies of inventories focus only on rm/industry
level analyses; only a few general equilibrium analyses exist. The motivation of this
article is to investigate a micro-founded rational dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model that satises two stylised inventory facts: (1) production is more volatile
than sales and (2) inventory investment is procyclical. Specically, we construct a DSGE
model with a stockout constraint and a production chain; the stockout constraint means
that no seller can sell more products than the inventories she holds, and the production
chain means that one rms output is used as a production input by other rms, and
this repeats.
In a sense, this article is a general equilibrium extension of Kahn (1987, 1992), who
rst analysed the stockout constraint. The key trade-o¤ under the stockout constraint
is that having too much inventory is costly because unsold goods impose a carrying
cost (Jorgensons user cost), while having too little inventory is also costly because the
risk of losing sales opportunity due to stockout is too high. Balancing carrying cost
against stockout probability, rms choose the optimal level of inventories. As a result,
the optimal level of inventories is an increasing function of expected demand; given the
level of inventories, strong demand reduces the expected amount of unsold goods and
raises the stockout probability.
Our research, however, is most closely related to Khan and Thomas(2004b) fully
rational DSGE for inventories. In comparing the (S,s) and stockout avoidance models,
they conclude that the former is superior to the latter, partly because rms have almost
no inventories in their stockout avoidance model.
However, we conjecture that the competitive goods market in their model is not
compatible with the existence of unsold goods (inventories carried over to the next
1For example, Fitzgerald (1997) reports that "changes in inventory investment are, on average, more
than one-third the size of quarterly changes in real GDP over the postwar period." See also Blinder and
Maccini (1991).
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period). Consider rmsdecisions at di¤erent points in one period. Certainly, when
rms decide their production, there is an incentive to hold inventories as bu¤ers, because
some factor inputs are decided before the realisation of aggregate shocks in their model.
However, when rms decide their sales, there is little incentive to hold inventories,2
because all aggregate shocks are already revealed. In their competitive goods market,
the price of goods should rise if demand is strong and vice versa, until the market clears
(i.e., no inventories exist). At the end of the day, no inventories are carried to the next
period.
In contrast, in our non-Walrasian goods markets, price does not equate demand and
supply; instead, we assume price posting. Indeed, we claim that neither instances of
stockouts nor unsold goods take place under exible price. In sum, the most important
di¤erence between Khan and Thomasmodel and ours is that they assume a competitive
goods market, while we assume non-Walrasian goods markets.
Simulating our model, we nd several observations. First, our model quantitatively
satises the two stylised inventory facts. The intuition is as follows. When a positive
demand shock hits rms, their inventories are initially reduced, and thus rms want to
replenish inventories. Moreover, the target level of inventories becomes higher than the
normal level, because the demand is stronger than usual. Hence, in subsequent periods,
rms have to produce more than they sell in order to accumulate inventories. Thus,
inventory investment is positive when sales and production are high, while production is
more volatile than sales. Although this mechanism was predicted by Kahn (1987) in his
rm level analysis, one of our contributions is to quantitatively endorse his prediction
in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.
Although our model only explicitly assumes the stockout constraint, it generates
the mechanisms predicted by the cost shock and production smoothing models. Im-
portantly, even though we do not intend to explicitly build these mechanisms in our
model, they must, naturally and inevitably, appear in our fully rational, micro-founded
2It is still possible that, if the marginal cost is expected to increase very sharply, rms carry in-
ventories to the next period (production smoothing motive). However, such a motive seems to be
quantitatively too weak to generate a signicant amount of steady-state inventories (See Section 2.2.2).
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environment. On the one hand, with a positive productivity shock (i.e., a negative cost
shock), production increases but sales do not increase very much; as a result, inventories
increase when production increases, while production is more volatile than sales. On
the other hand, inventories certainly decrease right after a positive demand shock, and
production does not react quickly because of the convex cost function. More speci-
cally, if a band-pass lter is applied to the simulated data series, our model nds that
production is less volatile than sales and inventory investment is countercyclical at very
high frequencies. In sum, in our model, the following three leading mechanisms are all
working: cost shocks, production smoothing and stockout constraint. Or, equivalently,
our model nds that these three mechanisms predicted by rm/industry level analyses
are all alive even in our micro-founded DSGE framework.
Another important nding in our model simulation is the slow adjustment of invento-
ries, which is found in several empirical studies.3 The key mechanism behind this is the
production chain4. When an intermediate goods producer (M-rm) wants to replenish
its inventories of intermediate goods (M-goods),5 it has to increase its own production
and its use of M-goods provided by other M-rms. That is demands for other M-rms
goods and reduces their inventories. This process repeats. In other words, increasing
inventories in one rm decreases inventories in other rms. Thus, the adjustment of
inventories (or intermediate goods) in aggregate is slow.
This slow adjustment of inventories also generates two by-products: higher volatility
of working hours, and lower correlation between labour productivity and output, than the
standard real business cycle (RBC) model. For the former, di¤erent from the standard
RBC model, there is one extra production factor in our model   M-goods. However,
because the adjustment of M-goods is slow, rms are forced to use more labour input to
compensate for the sluggish adjustment of M-goods during booms. Indeed, our model
3See Blinder and Maccini (1991), among others. Also, Ramey and West (1997) interpret the persis-
tent inventory to sales ratio as one expression of the slow adjustment of inventories.
4However, the primary purpose of explicitly modelling the production chain is to generate a realistic
sales volume, which is much larger than the volume of production due to the use of intermediate goods.
Note that under representative rm models, production is (almost) equal to sales.
5Note that our model analyses the stockout constraint in M-goods markets. Thus, inventories in our































Figure 1: Inventory cycle in Japan. Source: MITI, Japan.
predicts that M-goods price increases sharply after a positive demand shock, which
encourages rms to substitute M-goods with labour. As a result, labour productivity (=
output/hours) does not increase when output increases, because the increases in working
hours are large enough to o¤set those in output; thus the correlation between labour
productivity and output is low in our model. In sum, by adding stockout constraint and
production chain, our model improves the standard RBC model in terms of labour.
Finally, our model can replicate so-called inventory cycles (Figure 1 and 2). In this
respect, the model is successful to some extent. Our model generates simulated data,
which exhibit cycles in the phase diagrams (See Figures 6 and 7 on page 33). How-
ever, although Shibayama (2007) nds sine curve impulse response functions (IRFs) by
conducting VAR-based analyses, the theoretical model in this article only generates over-
damped oscillations, which means that there is a mechanism that generates oscillation,
but its e¤ect is not strong enough to exhibit sine curve IRFs.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews both theoretical and empirical
literature, and summarises the stylised inventory facts. Our model satises not only
the two famous stylised facts, but also additional detailed facts. Section 3 establishes
the model environment. The key features of our model include: (i) in addition to



































Figure 2: Inventory cycle in the U.S. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and
Fed.
rms) and intermediate goods producers (M-rms), both of which use capital, labour
and M-goods as inputs, while the former produce nal goods (F-goods) which are used
as consumption or investment goods, while the latter supply M-goods; (ii) individual
M-goods are di¤erentiated from each other, and hence an M-rm must use M-goods
produced by other M-rms (production chain); and (iii) the sales of M-rms are subject
to the stockout constraint. Section 4 presents numerical results. The nal section
concludes. The technical details are relegated to the Appendices.
In terms of terminology, note that this article uses "she" for a seller and "he" for
a buyer. Also, the concept of inventories includes "goods on shelf" GoSt and "unsold
goods" Ut+1. Though this may sound ambiguous, we often need a word that represents
both, because they are closely related to one another; indeed, GoSt = Ut under a
simplied parameter setting. Inventory investment always means Ut+1   Ut.
2 Literature Review and Stylised Facts
This section reviews existing research. Despite inventorys importance in business cycle
research, most existing theoretical inventory models focus only on rm/industry level
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analyses. There have been only a limited number of analyses of inventories in the setting
of the DSGE model. In addition, key empirical research is also reviewed to reconsider
stylised inventory facts.
2.1 Theories in Firm/Industry Level Analyses
Although we adopt more detailed facts to evaluate the model performance, the fol-
lowing two traditional stylised inventory facts have motivated the theoretical inventory
research6:
(i) Production is more volatile than sales.
(ii) Inventory investment is procyclical.
2.1.1 Production Smoothing
The rst attempt to understand inventories was the simple production smooth-
ing/bu¤er inventories model, in which, analogous to consumption smoothing, rms
want to avoid wild uctuations in production because of a convex cost function (which
should be present even with the CRS production function in general equilibrium), and in-
ventories are used as bu¤ers against demand shocks. However, it is obvious that smooth
production is a concept opposite to volatile production, and it predicts that inventory
investment is negative when there is a positive demand shock. In sum, its predictions
contradict both of the above stylised facts.
2.1.2 Subsequent Models
Hence, subsequent researchers have made e¤orts to reconcile the production smoothing
motive and the two stylised facts. In rm/industry level analyses, there are several
strands of literature:7
6See Fitzgerald (1997) among others for a survey. Shibayama (2007) shows that these two facts
essentially mention the same one fact.
7Of course, some researchers have contrived tricks to amend the problems pointed out here. The
comments in the following list simply o¤er a glimpse of the modelsbasic features.
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 Serially correlated demand shocksmay explain to some extent why production
is not very smooth, but it alone cannot explain why the volatility of production
exceeds that of sales.8
 The non-convex cost function (or bunching production) has much empiri-
cal evidence from plant level studies, but it is uncertain as to whether the same
mechanism works in aggregate.9
 The cost shock model successfully explains stylised fact (i), while its empirical
evidence is mixed.10 However, without any additional assumptions, it predicts that
sales and inventories should be uncorrelated.
 (S,s) ordering policies successfully explains (i) under the assumption that pro-
duction takes place no sooner than the order is placed; a xed ordering cost induces
bunching orders, and hence orders (production by suppliers) are more volatile
than sales (of retailers).11 However, it does not predict (ii). Moreover, the e¤ect
of bunching orders may disappear in aggregate, and it alone cannot explain why
the stylised facts also hold within individual rms. In terms of empirical support,
the (S,s) models have strong supports especially for trading rms.12
 Inventories as production factors can explain (ii) but not (i). In aggregate level
analyses, where some simplication is inevitable, it may be di¢ cult to discriminate
inventory investment from capital investment in this model.13
It seems that the above lines of research have not yet reached successful results.
2.1.3 Micro-Founded Target Inventory Models
The following two models provide a micro-foundation for our general equilibriummodel.14
8See Blinder (1986) for a more detailed discussion.
9See Ramey (1991) and Ramey and Vine (2004) for this line of research.
10For example, Kahn (1992) nds that "demand shocks are indeed more important" for U.S. auto-
mobile rms.
11See Caplin (1985) and Caballero and Engel (1991), among others.
12See Hall and Rust (2000) and Mosser (1991).
13See Ramey (1989).
14It is important to recognise the di¤erences between the micro-founded target inventory models and
the empirical models (LQ models) such as Blanchard (1983) and West (1986). LQ models assume that
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 The inventories as sales facilities model is suggested from the standpoint of
empirical studies.15 The idea is that inventories, e.g., in showcases, are necessary to
sell goods as samples or specimens. When sales are strong and serially correlated, a
rm has to make up for the drop in inventories and, in addition, has to accumulate
additional inventories to keep up with the new sales level, which is higher than
before. Hence, in principle the model can explain both (i) and (ii).
 The stockout avoidance motive is probably the most natural setting, at least
as a casual conjecture. Similar reasoning to that of the inventories as sales facility
model shows that this can also explain (i) and (ii).16
Note that the inventories as sales facilities and stockout avoidance models are indeed
special cases of a more general class of models. The generalised micro-founded target








where Dt(:) is demand as a function of price Pt, GoSt is goods on shelf (inventories), and
 and  are parameters. The model reduces to the inventories as sales facilities model
in Bils and Kahn (2000) if  = 0, while it reduces to the stockout avoidance model
when  =  1. It is important to note that both models imply that the (target) level
of inventories, rather than inventory investment, is an increasing function of demand.
The author personally believe that target inventory models for producersnal goods
and (S,s) models for retailersand wholesalersinventories are the two most promissing
approaches.17
there is a xed target I/S ratio and any deviates from it incurs a cost. However, the micro-founded
target inventory models emphasise that the target I/S ratio is endogenously determined.
15See Bils and Kahn (2000) and Pindyck (1994).
16See Kahn (1987, 1992). Abel (1985) provides early work on the stockout constraint. Wen(2002)
also gives some empirical support for this idea.
17Blinder and Maccini (1991), for example, criticise the lack of research on producersintermediate
goods inventories.
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2.2 General Equilibrium Analyses
As mentioned above, only a few general equilibrium analyses have been done to date.
We list some of the theoretical works below.
2.2.1 (S,s) Models
Fisher and Hornstein (2000) and Kahn and Thomas (2004a, 2004b) focus on the (S,s)
model in the settings of DSGE.
Although the (S,s) model has some di¢ culties in rm/industry level analyses, Fisher
and Hornstein (2000) construct a DSGE model that satises the two stylised facts.
In their model, general equilibrium feedback seems to be the key to understanding
inventories.18 By incorporating a matching scheme in the goods market,19 they embed
a mechanism by which a high level of inventories induces retailers to lower their sales
prices so that consumers increase their search e¤orts (thus, sales are positively correlated
with inventories).20
On the other hand Khan and Thomas (2004a, 2004b) also nd that the (S,s) model
can explain two stylised inventory facts. In Khan and Thomas (2004b), they compare
(S,s) and stockout models and conclude that the former is better than the latter in terms
of the two traditional stylised facts (see the next subsection).
2.2.2 Micro-Founded Target Inventory Models
Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) constructed an inventory in the utility
model as a proxy for the stockout avoidance motive with imperfect information. Their
intuition is essentially the same as ours; when a positive shock hits a rm, its inventories
decline, but the rm then has to replenish inventories and build up inventories to achieve
the new, higher target level (because the sales shock is assumed to be persistent). They
18For the aggregation problem, they restrict the state space; the possible level of inventory holdings
are limited to a few natural numbers.
19Note that in this sense their model also can be regarded as a non-Walrasian model. Their pricing
mechanism is marginal (reservation) utility pricing, which is a special case of the Nash Bargain (sellers
have all the bargaining power), and similar to ours.
20See Blinder (1982) and Bental and Eden (1993) for similar insights.
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emphasise informational imperfection; rms cannot sell all of todays products in todays
market due to an informational problem. However, inventory in the utility is not based
on a micro-foundation, though it could be a useful short-cut.
Khan and Thomas (2004b) analyse the stockout constraint in a non-linear DSGE
framework. In comparing the (S,s), which is very successful, and stockout avoidance
models, they conclude that the former is superior to the latter, partly because rms
have almost no inventories in the stockout avoidance model.
However, we conjecture that the competitive goods market in their model is not com-
patible with the existence of unsold goods (inventories carried over to the next period).
Consider rmsdecisions at di¤erent points in one period. Certainly, when rms decide
their production, there is an incentive to hold inventories as bu¤ers against imperfect
information during one period.21 This is because some factor inputs are decided before
the realisation of aggregate shocks in their model. However, when rms decide their
sales, there is little incentive to hold inventories,22 because all aggregate shocks are al-
ready revealed. Having inventories just leads to a carry cost, but it no longer protects
rms unless the marginal cost of the next period is expected to be very high (production
smoothing motive). In their competitive goods market, the price of goods should rise
if demand is strong and vice versa, until the market clears (i.e., no inventories exist),
although Khan and Thomas (2004b) do not report the behaviour of the goods prices.
At the end of the day, no inventories are carried to the next period. In a sense, their
goods market is a Walrasian market with a vertical supply curve; unless the demand
curve is unorthodox, the market nds a price to equate demand and supply.
In contrast, in our non-Walrasian goods markets, price does not adjust demand and
supply; instead, we assume price posting. Indeed, we claim that neither instances of
stockouts nor unsold goods take place under exible price. In sum, our research is
most closely related to Khan and Thomas(2004b), but the most important di¤erence
21Note that inventories in this sentence are goods on shelf in our terminology. However, because there
is no unsold goods carried from the previous period in their model, goods on shelf are equal to todays
production.
22Note that inventories in this sentence are unsold goods in our terminology. Note also that inventory
investment means the time di¤erence of unsold goods in general.
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between their and our models is that they assume a competitive goods market, while we
assume non-Walrasian goods markets.23 Note that, because goods prices respond to all
the aggregate shocks, though not to idiosyncratic shocks, our model falls into the class
of exible price models in aggregate.
2.2.3 Inventories with Sticky Price
Hornstein and Sarte (2001) and Boileau and Letendre (2004) incorporate inventories
into a dynamic sticky price model.
The motivation to hold inventories used by Hornstein and Sarte is production smooth-
ing. In their model, after a positive monetary shock, (i) for agents who have an oppor-
tunity to change prices, sales plummet down because their new prices become higher
than other agents, but production does not move very much due to convex cost func-
tion, while (ii) for agents who do not change their price, sales and production increase.
According to them, initial changes in sales are o¤set in aggregate, while changes in
production are not. Thus, production is more volatile than sales.
Boileau and Letendre studied three types of models in the dynamic sticky price
model. The most successful one is the model they call the shopping-cost model,24 and it
creates more persistence in output and ination than the standard sticky price model.
At rst glance, their shopping-cost model seems to be similar to the micro-founded
target inventory model such as ours, in the sense that both models share the feature
that inventories help sales. However, it seems that their model should be regarded as
an inventories as production factors model, at least, in aggregate. This is because,
while inventories reduce the retailersshopping cost, the authors impose the zero prot
condition on the retailers at the same time. This means that, if retailers and producers
can be regarded as one big sector, inventories work as a production factor in this big
sector. Indeed, their nal algebraic results look like those of the inventories as production
factors model. In this sense, it is slightly questionable whether or not their model should
23In addition, while our model is solved by linearisation, they employ a non-linear solution method.
24The other two model investigated by Boileau and Letendre (2002) are a linear-quadratic model and
inventories as factors of production.
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be classied as the same class of the models as ours.
2.2.4 Other Important Research
Another important general equilibrium inventory paper is Diamond and Fudenberg
(1989).25 Although their model yields interesting results, including cyclical movements
and multiple equilibria, their economy is highly stylised. They assume that each agent
cannot have a (stochastic) production opportunity until she sells her products, and hence
their "inventories" represent the number of people who had a production opportunity
but have not yet sold their products.
2.3 Empirical Studies and Stylised Facts
This subsection briey reviews empirical research and draws implications.
2.3.1 Stylised Inventory Facts
Although, as mentioned in the previous subsection, two stylised inventory facts are well
known, we use more detailed facts in order to evaluate the model performance.
Most importantly, Wen (2002) reveals that the two traditional ndings hold only at
the business cycle frequencies (8 to 40 quarters); production is less volatile than sales and
inventory investment is countercyclical at very high frequencies (2 to 3 quarters).26 In
addition, Ramey and West (1997) suggest that the inventory to sales ratio (I/S ratio) is
persistent, which is perhaps essentially equivalent to the slow adjustment of inventories
estimated by Blinder and Maccini (1991).27 Finally, Bils and Kahn (2000) show that
the I/S ratio is countercyclical.
In sum,
1.a Inventory investment is strongly countercyclical at very high frequencies (2 to 3
quarters).
25See also Diamond (1982).
26In this connection, Hornstein (1998) states that inventory investments are important for short-term
output uctuations (6 quarters or less), rather than business cycle uctuations.
27Their model is often called an (empirical) target inventory model (though they are typically not
micro-founded). See also Blanchard (1983) and West (1986).
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1.b Inventory investment is procyclical at business cycle frequencies (8 to 40 quarters).
2.a Production is less volatile than sales at high frequencies.
2.b Production is more volatile than sales at business cycle frequencies.
3.a The I/S ratio is persistent and the adjustment of inventories is very slow.
3.b The I/S ratio is countercyclical.
There are a couple of supplementary comments. First, facts 1 and 2 (and hence
traditional facts (i) and (ii)) are essentially equivalent to one another (see Shibayama
(2007)). Second, while facts 1.a and 2.a support the production smoothing motive model,
1.b and 2.b are consistent with the target inventory models (see Sections 3 and 4 for
details).
2.3.2 Inventory Cycles
Inventory cycles are cyclical movements in the phase plan, wherein typical year-on-year
change (YoY) in inventories is on the x-axis, and YoY changes in production/shipment
are on the y-axis (See Figures 1 and 2). This phenomenon is stable over time. The
conjugate pair of complex roots in VAR coe¢ cients is detected in Shibayama (2007),
which is necessary for generating inventory cycles. Hence, in addition to the stylised
facts listed above, the objective of this theoretical research is to construct a DSGE
model that exhibits inventory cycles, as mentioned in the Introduction.
2.3.3 Other Empirical Issues
Negative Correlation Between I/S Ratio and Interest Rate: Bils and Kahn
(2000) report that the correlation between the real interest rate and I/S is negative (see
Table 2 in Bils and Kahn (2000)). They compute the correlation between expectations of
real interest rate and I/S conditional on proper information sets. Then they argue that
there must be some mechanism such as countercyclical markup to reconcile the FOC
with respect to inventories to the data. Their nding is puzzling because the target
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inventory models suggest that the optimal inventories are decreasing in the interest rate
(carrying cost). One possible way to understand this nding is that they essentially es-
timate the monetary policy rule, rather than the optimisation condition of inventories.28
Nonetheless, we want to point out that a serious puzzle exists in the inventory literature.
Inventories as Collateral: Related to the nancial side of the economy, Kashyap,
Lamont and Stein (1994) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) empirically show that small
rms, whose access to nancial markets is presumably limited, reduce their inventory
holdings more than large rms during recessions. Thus, they both conclude that, for
small rms, there is some form of interactions between inventories and nancial/liquidity
constraints.
Diminishing GDPVolatility and New InventoryManagement Since mid 1980s,
many industrialised countries have experienced a decline in the volatility of their GDP
and prices (though some authors, such as Comin and Philippon (2005), nd that the
variability of output is increasing over time at the rm level). In this regard, Kahn
et al. (2002) argue that improved inventory management (due to, say, new information
technology) allows rms to protect themselves from shocks. They show that the decline
in output volatility is salient more in the durable goods sector than in others. Their
claim is also numerically evaluated by using our model.
3 Model Environment and Some Intuition
This section illustrates the key features of the model, but the full derivation of the most
general model is relegated to Appendices A to C. This section motivates production
chain (Section 3.1), discusses the implications of stockout constraint (Section 3.2) and
shows price posting rule and other model assumptions (Section 3.3).
28Though controlling some information set looks like using the two-stage regression, their information
set is presumably not independent of disturbances (i.e., the variables in the information sets do not
work as IVs). Suppose, for example, that the monetary authority has a rule that it raises its policy
interest rate when sales are strong and the inventory level is low. With no remedy, if the estimation of
the FOC is less stable than that of the monetary policy rule, such computation essentially detects the
monetary policy rule, rather than the FOC w.r.t. inventories.
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F-firmsHH M-firms
Note: F- and M-firms mean f inal and intermediate goods




Among other assumptions, the stockout constraint and the production chain are
essential   the model aims to analyse their implication in general equilibrium  , while
idiosyncratic demand shock, price posting rule, etc. are rather technical assumptions.
The latter are necessary devices for modelling the non-Walrasian goods markets; stockout
implies that the goods markets do not clear.
3.1 Production Chain
There are three types of agents in the model: a representative household (HH), inter-
mediate goods producers (M-rms) and nal goods producers (F-rms), all of which
optimise. HH works, consumes and invests. Production factors for both types of rms
are labour, capital and intermediate goods (M-goods). Final goods (F-goods) are con-
verted into consumption and investment goods (it is possible to interpret F-rms as
retailers). A continuum of M-rms produce mutually di¤erentiated M-goods (à la Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition). A bundle of M-goods are necessary to produce not
only F-goods, but also M-goods in the production chain.
Looking at the Leontiefs input-output table, any two industries demand and supply
M-goods from and to one another. Because the input of M-goods is subtracted from
sales to compute value-added, sales are much larger than value-added in reality. On the
other hand, the stockout constraint implies that the target level of inventories (or goods
on shelf) is an increasing function of sales, not value-added. Hence, without modelling
the production chain, we underestimate the volume of sales   and hence the volume of
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the target level of inventories.29
Note that if the M-goods markets are frictionless, then the model reduces to a single
production sector model; the stockout constraint   a friction in M-goods markets  
makes the production chain worth analysing.
3.1.1 Implications of Production Chain
Di¤erent from the standard RBC model, however, there is one additional production
factor  M-goods. When a shock hits the model economy, capital cannot adjust quickly,
as in the standard RBC model, because its evolution is governed by the capital accu-
mulation equation. The adjustment of the additional production factor   M-goods  
is also sluggish. This is because of the production chain; when one M-rm wants to
increase its supply, it must use other rmsM-goods, which, in turn, implies that other
rms want to increase their production by using other rmsM-goods.30 In aggregate,
to produce M-goods, M-rms must consume M-goods! In sum, due to the production
chain, the adjustment of inventories is very sluggish in aggregate. In addition, this slow
adjustment of M-goods inventories has several important implications for labour (see
below for details).
3.2 Stockout Constraint
Our model explicitly analyses the e¤ect of the stockout constraint, which was rst ex-
amined by Kahn (1987), and our study is a general equilibrium extension of his market
equilibrium analysis.
Our model considers the stockout constraint on the M-good markets, and denes
29In this connection, consider the Leontief production function where the elasticity of substitution
between labour/capital and M-goods is zero M = 0 (see Section 4 for notations). Then the use of
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is the technology and M is the share parameter of value-added component V
M
t . The Leontiefs inverse
matrix   the most important concept in the input-output table analysis   shows the increase in the
output of one sector due to a unit increase in nal demand. Noting that M-goods produced are used








ss = (1  (1  M )) 1 =  1M > 1 in
the symmetric steady state (in our model, the matrix is actually 1 1). Hence, gross output uctuates
more when the share of intermediate goods is larger. In industrial countries, M ' 0:5, which implies
that the size of value-added is roughly one half of that of sales.
30To gain further intuition, see also the previous footnote.
17
goods on shelf GoSt as the sum of unsold goods Ut and (a portion of) todays production
Y Mt . In terms of terminology, GoSt and Ut are both (the level of) "inventories," but the
former is measured before the opening of M-goods markets, while the latter is after the
markets close.
The stockout constraint, the main friction in our model, means that no seller can sell
more products than the stocks on shelf GoSt. Hence,
St = min fGoSt;Mpt g (2)
where St is the sales andM
p
t is the potential demand for M-goods. The potential demand
is "potential" simply because it may not be realised due to stockout.31 In the simplest









t+1 + (1  Prt+1)Mt+1
	#
= Mt (3)




t is the stochastic discount factor
(SDF) between time t and t+1,33 Prt is the probability that a seller faces stockout and
Mt is the marginal cost/shadow price of inventories (Lagrange multiplier on the law
of motion of inventories). To understand the FOC, consider the additional one unit of
inventory (marginal inventory). If it is sold (i.e., stockout takes place), it brings P it+1
units of revenue to the seller, while if it is not sold, then it remains on the sellers hand
and its value is its shadow price Mt+1. Thus, the euqation means that the shadow price


















This equation states that the user cost of inventories (RHS) is equal to the PV of the
31It may be possible to express the stockout constraint in the form of a non-negativity constraint on
GoSt, but adding the non-negativity constraint complicates the algebra.
32It is the same as (10e) in Appendix C with  = 0, where  is the portion of todays output that
can be sold in todays market.




prot margin conditional that the marginal inventory is sold out. Note that the stockout
probability Prt is decreasing in inventories Ut and increasing in potential demand M
p
t .








There is a fundamental trade-o¤; stockout is costly because it means the loss of a
protable sales opportunity, but unsold goods are also costly because they impose a
carrying cost (or Jorgensons user cost) of unsold goods. Note that the nature of the
carrying cost is the cost of nancing inventories.
Hence, the target level of inventories is an increasing function of the potential de-
mand (which moves closely with sales), but is a decreasing function of the interest rate
(nancing cost) through SDF. When the potential demand is strong, for example, if
Ut were kept unchanged, the stockout probability would be too high while the level of
expected unsold goods would be too low; hence, rms have an incentive to accumu-
late inventories, and vice versa. Note that choosing optimal inventories is essentially
equivalent to choosing optimal stockout probability.
3.2.1 Implications of Stockout Constraint
The stockout constraint can (at least potentially) explain the two inventory stylised facts
(see also Kahn (1987)). One of the goals of this article is to quantitatively evaluate the
e¤ects of the stockout constraint in the DSGE framework.
The intuition is as follows. As mentioned above, under the stockout constraint, the
target level of inventory is an increasing function of the potential demand, which shows
movements quite similar to sales. Hence, inventory investment is naturally procyclical
(fact 1b). Furthermore, production must increase more than sales because, otherwise,
inventories decrease (fact 2b).
In addition, the I/S ratio is countercyclical because, during a recession, the interest









Ut = GoSt ( is assumed to be zero in the simplest version).
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rate is low and thus the carrying cost is low as well, which stimulates inventory holdings
relative to sales.
3.2.2 Inventories as Bu¤ers
It is important to note that the mechanism explained in the previous subsection is
expected to materialise at business cycle frequencies.
At very high frequencies, on the other hand, production smoothing can be explained
by the very basic convex cost function. Inventories work as bu¤ers against demand
shocks. Even if production technology ensures constant returns to scale (CRS), as long
as the labour supply is convex (due to the concave utility function), this mechanism
works. Because rms do not want to adjust their production quickly, inventories will
decrease right after a positive demand shock, and vice versa.
Note that both mechanisms   bu¤er stocks and stockout constraint   do not contra-
dict each other, and they indeed coexist in our model. Indeed, equation (3) also shows
the production smoothing motive. If there is not stockout probability (Prt+1 = 0), (3)
simply shows the marginal cost smoothing. Moreover, the cost shock model, in which
productivity shock directly a¤ects Mt , is also encompassed; when 
M
t is low (i.e., posi-
tive productivity shock), (3) implies that the optimal Prt+1 is also low (so sales is high),
which means that M-rms produce more to accumulate Ut+1 (see (5)).
In sum, the inventoriesFOC (3) embraces the three mechanisms: the stockout avoid-
ance, production smoothing and cost shock models. Our objective is not to pick up one
single "true" mechanism out of the three models, but to compare them quantitatively.
3.2.3 Inventories as Options to Sell
Also, we can interpret (4) as a derivative pricing equation, in which inventories are
interpreted as options to sell; having inventories, sellers have options to sell their goods.
It can be shown that the (4) has almost one-to-one correspondences to the Black-Scholes
option pricing formula (see Appendix C.2 for details).
Although sales (2) itself is not a smooth function, it is possible to nd FOC, because
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the expected sales is a smooth function due to demand uncertainties. This technique is
commonly used in the analyses of voting behaviours.
3.3 Structure of M-goods Markets
This subsection provides rather technical basis of the model. We recommend that inter-
ested readers consult Appendix A. Here, only the key assumptions are listed:
 Due to idiosyncratic shocks, individual sellers face di¤erent levels of demand.
Both stockout and unsold goods exist, implying that the M-market is non-Walrasian.
 Hence, we cannot use market clearing conditions as a pricing mechanism. In-
stead, we assume price posting by sellers, wherein buyers decide on the trading
quantities. BuyersFOCs are regarded as demand curves.
 M-goods are di¤erentiated from each other (Dixit-Stiglitzmonopolistic competi-
tion). Two-stage budgeting is modied by the cost e¤ect of losing variety.
However, note the following two model features. First, our model is a exible price
model in aggregate. In price posting, the M-goods prices can respond to all aggregate
shocks, but not to idiosyncratic shocks (hence, all sellers post the same price because
their sales prices are posted before observing idiosyncratic shocks). Such price rigidity
disappears in aggregate. Second, due to the CRS production function and price posting,
our model falls in the class of representative agent models in aggregate, despite
the heterogeneity caused by stockout.
Note also that it is possible to linearise the stockout constraint (2), intuitively be-
cause the numbers of sellers and buyers with binding stockout constraint (2) are smooth
functions in aggregate, even though (2) itself is not a smooth function from the individual
sellersviewpoint (See Appendix A.2 for details). In the simplest version of the model,
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aggregate sales and the law of motion of inventories are



















where Yt is todays output35 and M bt is the baseline demand which is the average of








t is the idiosyncratic shock to seller i.
4 Numerical Experiments
This section shows the calibration results. The analytical solution is linearised around
the non-stochastic steady state, and is simulated to obtain the second moments and
impulse response functions (IRFs).
4.1 Parameter Selection
To select parameters, we do not employ any optimal selection criteria. Rather, for the
sake of comparability, we follow the convention in the RBC literature. For the parameters
that are specic to our model, we select values to match some steady state values to the
data. The di¢ culty, however, is that two parameters  and  govern the steady state
I/S ratio, which means that there are many possible combinations of  and  that match
the observed I/S ratio. In addition, there are six coe¢ cients for the adjustment costs,
which are not pinned down by the rst moments. Hence, perhaps one possible criticism
is that our model has too many degrees of freedom in choosing parameters.
4.1.1 RBC Parameters
For exact values of the RBC parameters, see Table 1. For the elasticity of substitution
among varieties, we borrow the number that is commonly used in the sticky price models
35Under the assumption that Yt cannot be sold in todays market (i.e.,  = 0), the rst equation is




is the amount that is not sold due to stockout.
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( = 10). We select values for AR(1) coe¢ cients for technology shocks to match the
autocorrelation function of GDP (i.e., Corr fGDPt; GDPt 5g ' 0). Though these values
are smaller than in the standard RBC model, perhaps this is merely due to the existence
of adjustment costs and does not signify endogenous persistence.
Table 1: Benchmark Parameters for Model Simulations
Symbol Meaning In Benchmark
K Subjective discount factor (4% annual interest rate) 1.04?1/4
L Reciprocal of elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption 1.00
LL Reciprocal of elasticity of intertemporal substitution of labour 0.00
f Weight on leisure in period utility (Working hours = 1/3) 0.68
S Elasticity of substitution among M-goods 10.0
X Range parameter of idiosyncratic shock (U ss/Sss = 2 months) 0.40
c Share of today’s output that can be sold in today’s market 0.50
JM, JF Capital share in value added 0.35
RM, RF Elasticity of substitution btw M-goods and value-added compo. 0.30
dM Weight on value-added compo. of M-firms 0.50
dF Weight on value-added compo. of F-firms 0.05
NM, NF Depreciation rate of capital (Capital/GDP = 10) 0.015
eMK, eFK Coefficient on quadratic adjustment cost of investment 0.10
eMH, eFH Coefficient on quadratic adjustment cost of labour 1.50
eMM, eFM Coefficient on quadratic adjustment cost of M-goods use 1.00
_Mn AR(1) coefficient of Hicks-neutral technology shock to M-firms 0.75
_Fn AR(1) coefficient of Hicks-neutral technology shock to F-firms 0.85
4.1.2 Parameters Specic to the Model
Share Parameter of Value-Added: For the share parameter of the (notional) value-





in the M-rms is roughly 45%; the value-added is roughly 55% of sales. This number
is taken from the Japanese and U.S. Leontiefs input-output tables.36 Also, we set
F = 0:05 so that F-rms act as if they were the retailers who simply convert M-goods
into F-goods.
Note that the notional value-added V Mt and V
F
t , which appear in the denitions of
our production functions, are not consistent with the statistical concept of GDP. This
36Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications, Government of Japan (2004) and Bureau of
Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (2007).
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article uses terminology "GDP" to mean gross output minus the use of M-goods; e.g.,
GDPMt  Y Mt   PMssMMt 1 for M-rms. Also, we assume the Laspeyres price index so
that goods are evaluated by the price of the steady state as the base year.
Table 2: Endogenous Variablesin the Steady State
Symbol Meaning In Steady State
SDFt Stochasticdiscount factor (= real interest rate) K
Wt Wage rate 1. 76
P tM M-goods price 0. 9996
Qt Pr[cannot buy] (= number of available varieties) 0. 999
Pr t Pr[stockout] 0. 074
V tM Marginal cost of M-goods production (shadow price of M-goods) 0. 89
C t Consumption 0. 83
HtH Labour supply(= 1 ? leisure = HtM + HtF) 0. 28
S t Sales of M-goods 1. 79
MtM , MtF Use of M-goods as production factors 0. 86, 0. 93
YtM Gross outputof M-goods (= Mt+1M + Mt+1F ) 1. 79
YtF Gross outputof F-goods (= C t + ItM + ItF ) 0. 98
V tM (Notional) value-added in M-firms (= K tM
JM HtM
Ý1?JM Þ) 0. 93
V tF (Notional) value-added in F-firms (= K tF
JF HtF
Ý1?JF Þ) 0. 053
Ht
Mp , Ht
F p Labour input for production 0. 27, 0. 015
ItM , ItF Investment 0. 14, 0. 008
K tM , K tF Capital at the beginning of period t 9. 37, 0. 53
U t Unsold M-goods at the beginning of period t 1. 25
Z tH Preference shock 1. 00
Z tMn , Z tFn Hicks-neutral technologyshock in production function 1. 00, 1. 00
Elasticity of Substitution Between Value-Added and Input M-goods: For the
elasticity of substitution between the notional value-added component and intermediate
goods K (K = F;M), we do not have much guidance. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)
used a value of 0:7, while Bruno (1984) suggested 0:3 to 0:4.37 Because, presumably, the
substitution should be low, we use 0:3.
Magnitude of Idiosyncratic Shock and Proportion of Output that Can be
Sold in Todays Markets: There are two parameters that a¤ect the steady state
37Basu (1996) regards Brunos survey as an upper bound.
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I/S ratio: the upper and lower supports of the uniform idiosyncratic shock =2, and the
portion of todays products that can be sold in todays market . In the data, the I/S
ratio is roughly 2 months (0:67 quarter).38
On one hand, if we set  = 1, as in most rm/industry level analyses, aggregate
inventories do not move very much. This is because we assume that production is
decided after observing all of the aggregate shock. Hence, if M-goods rms can sell all of
their products in the current period market, they, as a collective agent, can respond to
aggregate shocks almost fully. Certainly, inventories still vary over time as the interest
rate changes over time, and so does the carrying cost. However, in a sense, inventories
merely follow other key variables in this case; hence, the model behaves very similarly
to the standard RBC model. On the other hand, if we set  = 0 (i.e., GoSt = Ut), (2)
implies that Uss > Sss, which clearly contradicts the data. If we could know how well
rms responded to contemporary aggregate shocks in the real world, we could pin down
the value of .
Our strategy is as follows. We rst naively set  = 1=2, as simply the midpoint
between the two extremes, and then choose  = 0:4 so that the I/S in the model
economy is 2 months.
Convenience Yield on Inventories: Stockout probability, which is roughly 5% to
9% in the data according to Bils (2004), is mainly a¤ected by the subjective discount
factor  elasticity of substitution among varieties  and convenience yield c1. Essentially,
any parameters that determine the opportunity cost of holding inventories a¤ect the
steady state stockout probability. If the opportunity cost of lost sales is high, the
optimal stockout probability is lower. Given  = 10, we select c1 = 0:00 (we assume no
convenience yield), so that Prss = 7:4%.
Adjustment Costs: We assume quadratic adjustment costs, which are rather stan-
dard in DSGE research. Specically, we set MK = FK = 0:1, MH = FH = 1:5 and
MM = LM = 1:0.
38See Ramey and West (1997), for example.
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4.2 Numerical Results
A shock to F-rmsproduction function (F-shock) can be regarded as a pure demand
shock for M-rms, while a shock to M-rmsproduction function (M-shock) works as a
demand shock and a supply shock from the viewpoint of individual M-rms.
In this subsection, all the simulated data are HP-ltered, unless otherwise mentioned.
Also, "relative volatilities" are standard deviations relative to that of total GDP or M-
rmsGDP. Similarly, "correlations" are correlations with total GDP or M-rmsGDP.
4.2.1 Second Moments
Table 3 summarises the second moments generated by the model simulations. The
main results are (i) compared to the RBC model, our model considerably decreases the
correlation between labour productivity and hours worked and (ii) it satises the two
stylised inventory facts.
Correlation of Inventory Investment with GDP: Inventory investment is posi-
tively correlated with M-rmsGDP for both shocks. With M-shocks, it is not surprising
to observe this positive correlation (0:65); this is exactly what the cost shock model ex-
pects. However, it is more important to nd a positive correlation (0:31) even with a
pure demand shock. In data, the correlation is 0:66.
The near-zero correlation between inventory investment and total GDP (M-rms
GDP plus F-rmsGDP) with F-shocks is the artefact of the model assumptions be-
cause the F-shock directly increases the F-rmsvalue-added, but it decreases M-rms
inventories. Indeed, if we use preference shocks instead of the F-shocks, the correlation
is even higher. However, preference shocks deteriorate other dimensions of the model
performance, so we do not choose this option.
Relative Volatility of Sales: Sales are less volatile than output for both types of
shocks; the standard deviation of sales relative to that of M-rmsGDP is 0:77 for both
F- and M- shocks in our model, while this value is 0:71 in the data. With M-shocks,
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this is not surprising, because the source of the shock lies on the production side, as the
cost shock models predict. However, it is important to note that, even when the source
of the shock lies on the demand side, production is more volatile than sales.
Cited from Cooley and Prescott (1995)











relative s.d. 1.35 - 0.57 0.24 4.41 - 0.45
corr 1.00 - 0.99 0.84 0.99 - 0.98 almost 1
Data
relative s.d. 1.72 0.71^ 0.92 0.50 4.79 0.27^ 0.52
corr 1.00 0.94^ 0.86 0.83 0.91 0.66^ 0.41 -0.26*
Notes: "relative s.d." means s.d. relative to s.d. of output. Italics are s.d., not relative s.d.
           "corr" means correlation with GDP.
            ^indicates that numbers are taken from Khan & Thomas (2004)
           * indicates that numbers are taken from Gali (1999).
Stockout Model (elasticity btw Value-add & M-goods = 0.3)










Technology shock to M-firms: rho = 0.75, sigma = 0.7%
relative s.d. 2.83 0.77 0.99 0.18 4.64 0.29 0.36
corr 1.00 0.81 0.93 0.44 0.53 0.62 0.23 -0.13
 of which M-firms
relative s.d. 1.04 0.77 0.96 4.25 0.28 0.36
corr 1.00 0.90 0.93 0.51 0.65 0.30 -0.06
Technology shock to F-firms: rho = 0.85, sigma = 0.7%
relative s.d. 1.57 0.55 0.87 0.20 4.52 0.15 0.26
corr 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.73 0.99 0.01 0.63 0.42
 of which M-firms
relative s.d. 0.53 0.77 1.63 8.46 0.28 0.67
corr 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.31 -0.88 -0.95
Notes: For "of which M-firms," "relative s.d." and "corr" show s.d. relative to that of
           M-firms' output and correlation with M-firms' output, respectively.
           Relative s.d. of M-firms' output shows s.d. of M-firms' output relative to that of
          total output. See also notes above.
Table 3: Simulation results (comparison to the standard RBC model).
Intuition: For F-shocks, the target inventory models explain the mechanism behind
two observations: (i) procyclical inventory investment and (ii) output more volatile than
sales, as follows. When a positive demand shock hits M-rms, of course, their inventories
initially decline, simply because buyers take away M-goods from the shelf of M-rms.
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However, keeping such a low level of inventories is costly, because it leads to a too
high stockout probability (in the stockout model) and because of an ine¢ cient sales
activity without enough samples in showcases (in the inventories as sales facility model).
The common prediction among the target inventory models is that the target level of
inventories is an increasing function of demand/sales. Hence, with a positive demand
shock, the target level of inventories is higher than usual and, as a result, M-rms have
an incentive not only to replenish their declined inventories but also to accumulate more
inventories to meet the higher demand. However, as the law of motion of inventories
(10j) shows,
Ut+1   Ut = Y Mt   St
the output of M-goods Y Mt must increase more than the sales of M-goods St to build up
inventories Ut+1, suggesting that (i) Y Mt increase more volatile than St and (ii) Ut+1 Ut
is positive when Y Mt and St increase. Indeed, this article conrms this mechanism
quantitatively in the DSGE setting.
Relative Volatilities of Consumption and Investment: For both shocks, our
model inherits the basic nature of the standard RBC model. That is, the relative
volatility of consumption is too low, while that of investment roughly matches the data.
This is not surprising since our model is an extension of the standard RBC model. The
correlation of investment and value-added is too low for the M-shock (0:53), though. The
reason for this is that the M-shock, opposed to F-shock, raises the price of investment
goods (F-goods), relative to M-goods price.
Persistence of I/S Ratio: According to Ramey andWest (1997), the rst and second
autocorrelations of the inventory-sales relationship (akin to I/S ratio) range from 0:88 to
0:97 and 0:80 to 0:91, respectively. This persistency is regarded as another expression of
the slow adjustment of inventories. In our model, the rst and second autocorrelations of
the I/S ratio are 0:88 and 0:61 for F-shocks and 0:71 and 0:25 for M-shocks, respectively.39
39These values are dened as Ut=St, where St is the M-rmssales. The results are almost the same






























Figure 3: Autocorrelation functions. "GDPtot" and "Unsl/Sal" mean gross output
minus the use of M-goods, and unsold goods divided by sales (I/S ratio), respectively.
The I/S ratios in our model are considerably persistent (see Figure 3), though they
are somewhat less persistent than the data. Moreover, in our model the I/S ratio is
countercyclical because of the procyclical interest rate.
The key mechanism behind this is the production chain. Suppose a positive demand
shock hits an M-rm. This rm faces a decrease in its inventories and expects strong
future sales, so it wants to replenish its inventories; much more, it raises its inventory
level to catch up with the new higher level of sales. As a consequence, it has to increase
its production and, hence, the use of production factors, including M-goods. However,
this, in turn, implies that the demands (and hence the sales) of other M-rms increase,
and that their inventories are reduced. In other words, the production chain implies that
one rms replenishment of inventories reduces other rmsinventories. Therefore, the
adjustment of inventories is slow in aggregate. It is important to note that M-goods price
increase sharply after a positive F-shock, while M-goods price does not decrease very
much after a positive M-shock. Note that unit labour cost (wage/labour productivity)
decreases after a positive M-shock (= a negative cost shock), implying that M-goods
becomes expensive in relative term.
In this regard, our model can suggest a very simple reason that reduced form target
inventory models estimate an implausibly slow adjustment speed; it is indeed slow! Cer-
tainly, Blinder and Maccini (1991) persuasively argue that "One major di¢ culty with
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stock-adjustment models is that adjustment speeds generally turn out to be extremely
low; the estimated  is often less than 10 percent per month. This is implausible when
even the widest swings in inventory stocks amount to no more than a few days of produc-
tion."40 Reiterating our nding, the inventoriesadjustment is slow in aggregate due to
production chain, although it seems to be implausible from the viewpoint of individual
rms. Partial equilibrium analyses may miss the general equilibrium feedback through
volatile M-prices; during a boom, high M-prices discourage M-rms from replenishing
their inventories quickly by producing more.
Working Hours: In our model, working hours are more volatile than in the standard
RBC model. As a result, the correlation between hours and labour productivity is lower
than the standard RBC model. If we focus on M-rms, this correlation is  0:06 and
 0:95 with M- and F-shocks, respectively.
One of the major drawbacks of the standard RBC model is that it counterfactually
exhibits an almost perfect correlation between labour productivity and working hours.
Although one way to overcome this caveat is to add demand shocks (see Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) for government expenditure, and Bencivenga (1992) for preference
shocks), such demand shock models are criticized by Gali (1999), in which a structural
VAR shows that the correlation between labour productivity and hours is negative for
technology shocks, but positive for other shocks. Gali (1999) suggested that a dynamic
sticky price model with a labour e¤ort model can, at least potentially, generate a negative
correlation. However, our model improves the model performance in this respect even
without price rigidity.
The mechanism that generates volatile working hours in our model is the slow adjust-
ment of inventories; due to the production chain, one rms replenishment of inventories
reduces other rmsinventories in aggregate. The right panels of Figures 4 and 5 show
the IRFs of production factors. It is clear that, for both types of shocks, the increase
in M-goods use is less volatile than M-goods production and labour input compensates
40See Blinder and Maccini (1991, p.81).
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Data
Model (M-firms and F-firms)
tech shock to M-firms: rho = 0.75, sigma = 0.7%
tech shock to F-firms: rho = 0.85, sigma = 0.7%
Model (M-firms only)
tech shock to M-firms: rho = 0.75, sigma = 0.7%
tech shock to F-firms: rho = 0.85, sigma = 0.7%
Note: Data is OECD average (cited from Wen (2003)).
Table 4: Model behaviour at different frequency domains.
High Frequencies (2-3quaters) Business Cycle Frequencies (8-40quaters)
Var(sales)/Var(output) Cor(d(inventory), Var(sales)/Var(output) Cor(d(inventory), sales)
1.10 -0.43 0.72 0.58
Var(sales)/Var(output) Cor(d(inventory), Var(sales)/Var(output) Cor(d(inventory), sales)
0.18 0.21 0.83 0.60
0.36 -0.97 0.56 0.62
Var(sales)/Var(output) Cor(d(inventory), Var(sales)/Var(output) Cor(d(inventory), sales)
0.32 0.36 0.82 0.29
1.02 -0.92 0.76 0.63
such sluggish adjustment of M-goods. Note that, because an increase in technology di-
rectly contributes to the increase in output, the increase in labour is roughly 50 to 60%
of that in output in the standard RBC model (see Table 1).
The overly low volatility of working hours predicted by the standard RBC model is
closely related to the overly high correlation between labour productivity and output.
For example, in the standard RBC model, the increase in working hours during a boom
is not large relative to the increase in output, and hence output/hours increases during
a boom. However, in our model, hours increase enough to decrease output/hours, and
hence corr{output/labour, output} becomes negative.
4.2.2 Frequency Analysis
This subsection exploits the band-pass lter developed by Baxter and King (1999) to
the simulated data. For the summary, see Table 4. At business cycle frequencies (8-40
quarters), both shocks perform quantitatively well.
At high frequencies (2-3 quarters) the results with M-shocks fail to mimic the data;
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the sales volatility relative to output volatility (0:32) is too low and inventory investment
is positively correlated to sales (0:32). This nding supports the view that the main
driving force of the economy is demand shocks not supply shocks.
On the other hand, F-shocks generate results qualitatively similar to the data, es-
pecially for M-rms; inventory investment is negatively correlated to sales ( 0:92) and































































Figure 5: Selected impulse response functions to a positive supply shock (a shock to
M-rmsproduction).
duction smoothing model predicts, inventories work as bu¤ers at high frequencies. Due
to the convex cost function, it is costly to change the production level very frequently;
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hence rms use inventories as bu¤ers to prevent their production from wildly varying
over time.
4.2.3 Impulse Response Functions and Inventory Cycles
Our model has two (or one, depending on parameters) pairs of conjugate complex roots
whose absolute values are less than one. Because no impulse response functions exhibit
clear oscillations (see Figures 4 and 5), we can say that our model shows over-damped
oscillations. Roughly speaking, in our model, there exist a potential mechanism to yield
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Figure 6: A sample path in phase diagrams generated by shocks to F-rmsproduction.
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Figure 7: A sample path in phase diagrams generated by shocks to M-rmsproduction.
Simulated data are converted to the year-on-year (YoY) growth rate in the right panel.
However, in sample paths, our model yields cycles that are quite similar to the
observed inventory cycles (see Figures 6 and 7), although the shape of cycle is not clear
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with F-shocks. The typical length of cycles (if they exist) seems to be around 15 to
19 quarters, which is somewhat longer than Kitchin cycles (13 quarters), is close to
the Japanese post-war average (16.8 quarters), and is shorter than the U.S. post-war
average (21 quarters).41 Importantly, the sample paths with M-shocks (right in Figure
8) show a time lag between peaks and bottoms of production/sales and unsold goods
(inventories). Such a time lag, perhaps caused by the slow adjustment of inventories,
is called a phase shift. The phase shift between production (or sales) and inventories is




































































Sample Path with F-shocks
Figure 8: Sample paths of selected variables. Left panel shows the actual data (Japanese
industrial production); middle and right panels show samples paths generated by F- and
M-shocks, respectively.
4.2.4 Changing Magnitude of Friction
Kahn et al. (2002) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) argue that the decline in
GDP volatility is due to an improvement in inventory management technology. To
test this idea, we simulate the model for various values of  and . We interpret an
improvement in inventory management as a lower value of  (smaller magnitude of
idiosyncratic shock) or a higher value of  (a larger portion of todays output that can
be sold in todays market). The results are summarised in Figures 9 and 10.
The e¤ects of changing the variation in idiosyncratic shock. The source of aggregate
shock is shocks to M-rms. A lower  (x-axis) implies lower goods market frictions.
41For Japanese business cycles, the number is the average of all business cycles See Economic and
Social Research Insutitute, Cabinet O¢ ce, Government of Japan (2004) and NBER (n.d.).
42See Shibayama (2007).
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Figure 9: The e¤ects of changing the variation in idiosyncratic shock with demand shocks
(shocks to F-rms). A lower  (x-axis) implies lower goods market frictions. "I=SM" is
unsold goods divided by M-goods sales, and "I=Stot" is unsold goods divided by total
sales (M- and F-goods). Results are shown for  = 0, 0:5 and 1.
Figure 10: The e¤ects of changing the variation in idiosyncratic shock with supply shocks
(shocks to M-rms). A lower  (x-axis) implies lower goods market frictions. "I=SM"
is unsold goods divided by M-goods sales, and "I=Stot" is unsold goods divided by total
sales (M- and F-goods). Results are shown for  = 0, 0:5 and 1.
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"I=SM" is unsold goods divided by M-goods sales, and "I=Stot" is unsold goods divided
by total sales (M-goods + F-goods). Results are shown for  = 0, 0:5 and 1.
Changing the magnitude of idiosyncratic shock  does not signicantly change the
volatility of GDP in either case (see the lower-right panels). Interestingly, an increase
in the portion of todays products that can be sold in todays market  increases, rather
than decreases, GDP volatility for F-shocks, as opposed to their conjecture. This is
perhaps because inventories are a stabilising factor at very high frequencies, as shown
above. The more quickly M-rms can react to todays demand shocks, the more quickly
those shocks are transmitted to M-rmsproduction.
The I/S ratio decreases when either  goes down or  goes up in our experiments.
This supports Kahn et al. (2002), in the sense that they regard a declining I/S ratio as
evidence for their hypothesis. However, judging from the results of other experiments, it
seems that the observed decline in the durable goods sectors I/S ratio is not the cause
but the result of the decline in GDP volatility; the less volatile an economy is, the weaker
is rmsincentive to hold inventories to hedge their loss of sales opportunities.
Overall, our model shows a negative implication for the hypothesis that an improve-
ment in inventory management is the main reason for the decline in GDP volatility. The
key intuition is that inventories are destabilising factors at business cycle frequencies
but stabilising factors at very high frequencies; hence, it is uncertain whether holding
lower inventories implies a more stable economy.
5 Conclusion
This article investigates a fully rational dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with a stockout constraint and a production chain. Here, the stockout constraint simply
means that no seller can sell goods more than what she holds on the shelf (i.e., invento-
ries), even if she faces a strong demand. The key trade-o¤ in this market friction is that
a stockout is costly because it means the loss of a protable sales opportunity, while hav-
ing excess inventories is also costly because it imposes a too high carrying cost (nancing
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cost). The production chain means that a rms product is used as an input by other
rms. Our model has two types of rms: nal goods producers and intermediate goods
producers, both of which take a basket of intermediate goods as production factors. The
model constructed in this article is in the class of representative agent models without
any price rigidity; however, the intermediate goods market is non-Walrasian.
The model quantitatively satises stylised inventory facts. On the one hand, if
the source of the shock lies on the supply side, a positive technology shock pushes up
production, and such an increase in production leads to an increase in inventories, while
sales do not increase very much. This is exactly what the cost shock approach predicts.
One the other hand, if the source of the shock lies on the demand side, a positive demand
shock increases sales, and inventories initially decrease; inventories work as bu¤ers at
very high frequencies. However, due to stronger demand, the target level of inventories
also increases. In subsequent periods, production must increase more than sales, because
rms must not only replenish decreased inventories but also accumulate inventories to
meet the stronger demand. Because inventories increase as demand increases, inventory
investment is procyclical. These results are consistent with the bu¤er stock view and the
micro-founded target inventory models. In this sense, our model supports three leading
rm/industry level analyses: cost shock, production smoothing and target inventory
models. Note that, while our model explicitly assume the stockout constraint, it does
not assume anything for cost shock and bu¤er stock mechanisms; they both naturally
appear in our micro-founded environment.
In addition, due to the production chain, adjustment of aggregate inventories is quite
slow. When one rm want to replenish its inventories, it must increase its production.
However, such an increase in production must use other rmsinventories as production
factors. Hence, the adjustment of inventories is slow in aggregate. Note that such a
tight intermediate goods market leads to an increase in intermediate goods price; if
the change in intermediate goods price is ignored (i.e., the general equilibrium feedback
through price is ignored), it may seem easy to adjust inventory level quickly; but a sharp
increase in the intermediate goods price discourages rms from using them.
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The most important nding in this article is that the stockout constraint and produc-
tion chain generate a low correlation between labour productivity and output. The key
intuition behind this is the slow adjustment of inventories. When a positive shock hits
the model economy, rms cannot increase their use of intermediate goods because inven-
tories of intermediate goods cannot adjust swiftly in aggregate; as a result, intermediate
goods price increases. Thus, rms are encouraged to substitute their intermediate goods
input with more labour input (capital cannot adjust as in the standard RBC model). Al-
though the standard RBC model predicts the low volatility of working hours, our model
yields working hours volatile enough to match the data. When output increases, because
working hours increase considerably, labour productivity (i.e., output/hours) does not
increase very much. Compared to the standard RBC model, the stockout constraint and




The full derivation is shown in the following. The equation numbers indicated in the
MATLAB codes correspond exactly to the equation numbers in Appendix.43 We use the
word "number" instead of "measure" unless there is a risk of confusion.
A Structure of M-goods Markets
This subsection provides the details of technical assumptions.
A.1 Agents Distribute over [0; 1] [0; 1] ( R2)
Unlike the standard monopolistic competition models, we assume that agents distribute
over a rectangle rather than over a line segment. Specically, there is a continuum of
markets over [0; 1], and there is a continuum of sellers distributed over [0; 1] in each
market. In di¤erent markets, di¤erent varieties (types) of goods are traded; in each
market, all sellers sell the same variety of goods (there are one-to-one correspondences
between markets and varieties of goods).
In a discrete example, there are, say, 1,000 markets and 1,000 sellers in each market,
yielding a total of 1,000,000 sellers. If all sellers behave as buyers at the same time
(production chain), then there are 1,000,000 buyers as well. If each buyer visits all
markets, then 1,000,000 buyers appear in every market.44 Thus, each seller in a market
meets (on average) 1,000 buyers.45 Note that, though the discrete example is often used
in the sequel, the formal derivation is based on the continuum of agents.
A.2 Idiosyncratic Shock
Next, we assume that buyers do not distribute evenly in each market. That is, some
sellers meet many buyers while others meet only a few in every market. The uncertainty
43The MATLAB codes used in this paper are available upon request.
44Note that this exposition ignores F-rms. If F-rms are taken into account as buyers, then there is
a total of 2,000,000 buyers in each market. In the continuous model, the measure of sellers (M-rms)
is 1 (in R2), and the measure of buyers (M-rms plus F-rms) is 2 (in R2).
45Note that in a continuous setting, this means that each seller meets a positive measure of buyers.
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Figure 11: An example with nine buyers and three sellers. Buyers do not distribute
evenly over sellers.
in the number of buyers is called an idiosyncratic shock. A simple example is illustrated
in Figure 11. It should be clear that the idiosyncratic shock causes the mismatch between
buyers and sellers in every market.
From the sellersviewpoint, if a seller meets more buyers than GoSt=M bt , where M
b
t
be the baseline demand (demand per buyer), she faces a stockout; she sells all of goods
on her shelf but she loses some of her customers due to the stockout. Otherwise, she
has unsold goods Ut+1 which she carries to the next period. There is a key trade-o¤
between stockout and unsold goods. Having too low GoSt leads to too high a stockout
probability (loss of sales opportunity), but having too high GoSt leads to too high a
carrying cost of Ut+1.
In each market, one specic type (variety) of goods are traded. Thus, from the
buyersviewpoint, some buyers, who visit a busy seller in a market, cannot buy that
specic type of goods; because we assume imperfect substitution among varieties, these
buyers experience a utility cost.46 Buyers determine Mpt taking into account such losses
in variety (see Appendix A.4 for details).
46We assume that, once buyers visit a shop, they cannot visit other shops in the same market. This
assumption is necessary to make the idiosyncratic shock meaningful; otherwise, all buyers will buy each










































Interpretation of  the lower lef t panel:
* In each market, all sellers sit somewhere on the
  x-axis. Each seller  does not know where she sits in
  advance. Her sales are g iven by downward sloping
  line. The Horizontal line represents g oods on shelf.
* Pr[stockout] is leng th btw arrows.
* Ag g reg ate sales is the area of (B).
* U nsold g oods is the area of (C).
* Pr[Can Buy] is (B)/(A+B).
A.2.1 Uniform Distribution
We assume that the idiosyncratic demand shock follows a uniform distribution.47 More
specically, we assume that the potential demand for a seller Mpt is the sum of the



















where  is the parameter that governs the support, and the variance (2=12) of the
distribution of ept .
A.2.2 Derivation of Key Equations
The easiest way to understand the following results is by examining the graph above.
The two panels in the upper half show how to derive the lower right panel; the downward
sloping lines in the two left panels are identical, and represents potential demand Mpt .
47Unfortunately, a simple urn-ball analysis implies a degenerate distribution; if buyers visit sellers
randomly, all sellers meet an equal number (measure) of buyers.
48It could be more natural to assume that eit is the shock on the number of buyers, so that M
p
t =
M it (Nb + e
i
t) where Nb is the average number of buyers. However, it turns out that the following
computation becomes extremely messy with this specication.
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If the number of buyers is normalised to one, the area under this line (i.e., (A) and (B))
is equal to baseline demand M bt .
In the lower left panel, the downward sloping line Mpt shows how buyers distribute
over sellers. Each point on the x-axis represents a seller, and the height of the downward
sloping line at each point on the x-axis shows the number of buyers who meet that seller.
Note that our assumptions about CRS and price posting (see below) guarantee that all
sellers hold the same level of GoSt, which is, thus, represented by the horizontal line in
the lower left panel. Hence, area (A) implies that potential demand Mpt exceeds GoSt,
and thus the area shows unsatised (potential) demand. From areas (A) and (B), we
can compute the probability that, in the market for each type of good, a buyer can buy
that type of good: Pr [a buyer can buy a good] = Qt = (B)=((A) + (B)).
From the viewpoint of each seller, she does not know in advance where her position
is on the x-axis in the lower left panel before the realisation of the idiosyncratic shock.
Hence, the probability that a seller faces a stockout is represented by the line segment
between the two arrows in the lower left panel.
Area (C) implies that GoSt that exceeds M
p
t ; they are carried to the next period
as unsold goods Ut+1. Also, a portion of todays production (1  )Y Mt is not placed
in todays market. Thus, Ut+1 equals area (C) plus (1  )Y Mt . Area (B) shows the
aggregate sales St, which equals E [sales of each seller] for each seller.
A.2.3 Key Equations
Therefore, primary school arithmetic yields the following results:
















= E [sales of a seller] (6b)








+ (1  )Y Mt (6c)














Several comments are in order. First, neither Mpt nor e
p
t appears in these expressions,
which implies that the idiosyncratic shocks in all markets average out. Second, because
there is a continuum of markets with a unit measure, Pr[a buyer can buy a good] is
equal to Qt, the measure (number) of the available varieties for each buyer. If goods
are considered collectively, a low Qt deteriorates the quality of goods due to imperfect
substitution among varieties (see A.4.1 for an intuitive example). Third, because there
is a continuum of sellers in each market with a unit measure, and because the measure of
market is unity, E [sales of a seller] is equal to the aggregate sales St. Fourth, regardless
of the distribution assumption, the following relationship must hold:




where  is the portion of todays output that can be placed in todays market. Remember
that we exogenously assume that only a portion of todays output can be placed in
todays market. Finally, the rst term of (6c) represents the unsold goods that cannot
be sold due to the idiosyncratic shock (area (C)) and the second term represents goods
that are not on sale in todays market.
A.3 Miscellaneous Comments for Assumptions
The idiosyncratic shock is necessary to deal with a kinked constraint; the stockout
constraint St = min fGoSt;Mpt g is not smooth and non-di¤erentiable. However, E [St]
becomes smooth by adding idiosyncratic shock from the viewpoint of each agent. This
technique to smooth non-smooth constraints by adding shocks is not new; it is commonly
used in analyses of voting behaviour, and was rst used for inventory analysis by Kahn
(1987). However, this article shows a nice interpretation: inventories as options to sell
(see C.2 for details).
The large number of agents is necessary for aggregation. In terms of sellers, due to
the law of large numbers (LLN), aggregate sales equal the expected sales (St = E [St]),
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which is a smooth function. Hence, we can linearise aggregate St. In terms of buyers,
Qt (the number of available varieties = probability of facing stockout) is also a smooth
function, because there are innitely many varieties (LLN).
It is also important to note that we need to conne our focus to the constant returns
to scale (CRS) for aggregation. Individual M-rms (sellers) have di¤erent levels of
Ut carried from the previous period, while the target level of goods on shelf GoSt(=
Ut+Y
M
T ) is the same for all M-rms, meaning that Yt varies among M-rms. Hence, if
production technology is not CRS, it is not possible to aggregate individual productions.
A.3.1 Timing Assumption
There is another assumption; rms cannot use M-goods they purchase today for todays
production. This assumption is logically necessary, especially for M-rms, because M-
rms must produce before M-markets open, while they can use M-goods only after
M-markets close.49
A.4 Monopolistic Competition and Cost of Losing Varieties
A.4.1 Imperfect Competition
In addition, we assume monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). There
are two reasons not to assume perfect substitution among varieties. First, if goods were
perfect substitutes for each other, buyers would not need to visit all markets. Second,
because perfect substitution implies zero prot, no seller wants to hold inventories; sellers
earn zero prot from their sales if they can sell their inventories, while they su¤er from
a carrying cost of unsold goods if they cannot.
In our environment, two-stage budgeting with quantity and price indices still holds.
However, as mentioned above, because the number of available varieties uctuates over
time, we need to consider the cost e¤ect of losing varieties.50
49Certainly, it is possible to assume that F-rms (but not M-rms) produce, say, in the second half
of each period, while M-rms produce in the rst half. However, it is a bit cumbersome if the timing
assumptions di¤er between F- and M-rms.
50Interestingly, one of the main motivations of Dixit and Stiglitz Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) is to analyse
44
The intuition of the utility cost is as follows. Let us consider a familiar example,
say, ice cream. Suppose a consumer prefers vanilla and chocolate ice creams equally,
but vanilla and chocolate ice creams are not perfect substitutes for one another. Also
suppose that their costs are the same. Then, one vanilla and one chocolate give higher
utility than two vanillas, because they are di¤erentiated from one another. However,
the costs of vanilla + vanilla and vanilla + chocolate are the same. Thus, given the
level of expenditures, having fewer varieties provides lower utility, and vice versa. Or,
equivalently, with fewer varieties available, the pecuniary cost of achieving a certain level
of utility is higher.
A.4.2 Number of Available Varieties
The cost e¤ect of losing varieties is not, in itself, of interest, and quantitatively its e¤ect
seems very weak under the plausible parameter range. It is a logical consequence of the
combination of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and stockout. Thus, we show
only the key results without derivations. Note that they are dened and discussed from
the viewpoint of a buyer.
First, Qjt is dened as an indicator function which is 1 if a buyer can buy the j-th






8><>: 1 if j-th variety is available0 otherwise
Due to LLN, Qt has two meanings: the number (measure) of available varieties and
the probability that a buyer can buy a variety without encountering a stockout. Note
that Qt is a distinct concept from 1  Prt, the probability that a seller does not face a
stockout.



























where  is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution among varieties. Several comments
are in order. First, (a) multiplying by Qjt means that unavailable goods are not taken
into account,51 and (b) dividing byQt means that the index is the "average" of individual
prices. Second, the integral is factorised as shown by the second equality because Qjt
and P jt are, in a sense, not correlated; P
j
t is assumed to be xed before the realisation of
the idiosyncratic shock (see below), while Qjt is not the choice of an agent (determined
exogenously by the idiosyncratic shock). Third, at optimum all sellers set the same price
(i.e. P it = P
j
t for 8i; j 2 [0; 1]) due to the price posting and CRS production technology.
As a result, P jt = P
M
t for 8j 2 [0; 1]. Indeed, many combinations of denitions of price
and quantity indices are logically consistent. We have chosen our denitions so that
P jt = P
M
t at optimum.
A.4.4 Quality-Adjusted Quantity Index
In this regard, the denition of the quantity index of M-goods that is consistent with













where K = F;M ; i.e., MFt is the index of M-goods purchased by F-rms, and M
M
t is
that of M-rms. Again, there are several comments parallel to the price index. First,
multiplying by Qjt means that unavailable goods are not taken into account, and (b) not
dividing by Qt means that the index is the "sum" of individual quantities. Second, at
optimum M it = M
j
t for 8i; j 2 [0; 1], because all prices are equal due to symmetricity.
Third, it is shown that the baseline demand M jt in equations (6) is not an index, but
51In general, the price index could be di¤erent among buyers, because they have di¤erent baskets of
goods. However, in our model, the price index is common to all buyers because of LLN.
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instead is measured in terms of a physical unit. Thus,











since both F- and M-rms use M-goods for their production. Since Qt < 1 and  > 1,




t . In other words, physical demand is larger than the index. This di¤er-
ence becomes larger as Qt becomes smaller. In this connection, MKt can be interpreted
as a quality adjusted quantity index   with fewer varieties, the quality of the M-goods
index becomes lower. Finally, Qt and hence MKt have the same value for any buyer due
to LLN.52
A.4.5 Two Stage Budgeting
From these two indices, the expenditure for M-goods of a buyer in sector K can be













t for K = F;M (8)
where the LHS is the direct denition of expenditures on M-goods, and the RHS means







t in (8) represents the cost of losing varieties. This is because,
under non-perfect substitution, to achieve a certain level of quantity index, an increase
in quantity in each variety must compensate for a loss of varieties (see (7)).
A.5 Price Posting
An important consequence of non-Walrasian intermediate goods markets is that we
cannot use the market clearing conditions as a pricing mechanism. Hence, we assume
the following price posting rule as an alternative. The rule follows a simple extensive
game, in which rst sellers set their price, then buyers are distributed among sellers
unevenly (idiosyncratic shock), and nally buyers choose optimal quantity if they are
52Although the exact components of available varieties may di¤er among buyers (say, some can buy
vanilla+strawberry, while others mint+chocolate), the number (measure) of available varieties is the
same (2 varieties in this ice cream example).
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not subject to a stockout. This extensive game is played in each M-market in every
period. We assume that (i) in each market, only one identical variety of goods are
traded (varieties and markets are one-to-one correspondences to each other), (ii) in each
period, each buyer visits only one seller for each variety (i.e., only one visit in each
market), and (iii) even if he fails to buy a variety due to a stockout, he cannot visit
other shops in that market.
0. All the aggregate shocks are revealed.
1. Anticipating the buyersaction, sellers set their sales price before the realisation
of the idiosyncratic shock. Once a seller decides her price, she cannot change it
until the next period (price posting).
2. The idiosyncratic shock is revealed; buyers are distributed among sellers unevenly.
As a result, some sellers meet many buyers while others meet only a few.
3. At each shop, all buyers stand in a queue, and then buyers, in order, choose an
optimum amount to buy until goods on shelf run out. The order in the queue is
stochastic for buyers; a buyer cannot buy the good if goods on shelf run out before
his turn. In this case, he simply loses one variety.
A few remarks are in order here. First, due to the assumption that sellers set their
sales price before observing the idiosyncratic shock, and the assumption of constant re-
turns to scale, all sellers choose the same sales price. Second, the measure of available
goods varies over time but, in each period, the LLN guarantees that all buyers enjoy
the same measure of available varieties, although the varietiescomponents di¤er among
agents. Third, analytically this price posting rule implies that sellers take buyersde-
mand function as a given, while the buyers take the M-price as a given. Algebraically,
we rst obtain the FOC w.r.t the use of M-goods for each M-price, and then we obtain
the FOC w.r.t. M-price subject to the demand function. Note that (i), individual sellers
cannot deprive other sellerscustomers in our market structure (ii) sellers exploit the
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slope of the demand curve as monopolists, and (iii) the quantity traded is not socially
optimum.53
Finally, the resulting pricing is a slightly generalised version of the markup formula
in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model. Namely, there exists ~




Mt , where 
M
t is the marginal cost of producing M-goods
and ~ ?  is the elasticity of substitution that is adjusted by Qt and Prt.
B Optimisation Problems of Individual Agents
This section denes the optimisation problems of individual agents.
B.1 Household












Ct +Bt;t+1 = Rt 1;tBt 1;t +WtHHt +D
iv
t
The period utility U [:; :] is time additive, is discounted by the subjective discount factor
t, and takes consumption Ct and leisure 1   HHt as arguments, where the total time
endowment is normalized to one and HHt is the labour supply.
The period budget constraint has cash outow in the LHS and inow in the RHS. The
LHS means that HH spends its resources on consumption and one-period bonds Bt;t+1,
while the RHS implies that cash inows are the sum of bond redemption Rt 1;tBt 1;t,




HH takes the real interest rate Rt 1;t, wage rate Wt and Divt as givens. All the rst
order conditions (FOCs) are quite standard.
53This is not only because of the price posting, but also because of externalities (see C.3).
54Alternatively, we can assume that there are innitely many HHs which own both F- and M-rms.
In that case, dividends are assumed to be state contingent, and thus all household enjoy the same level
of cash inow; as a result, whole HHs reduce to one sector in aggregate.
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B.1.1 Functional Form



















where  is the weight for leisure, and 
 and 
L are the elasticities of intertemporal
substitutions of consumption and leisure, respectively. When 
L = 0, our utility function
reduces to Hansens indivisible labour model.
B.2 Firms
We assume that quadratic adjustment costs apply to changing labour demand and input
of M-goods, as well as investment.
B.2.1 M-FirmsOptimization Problem































































KMt+1 = (1  M)KMt + IMt   MK(IMt   MKMt )2=KMt
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The objective function says that M-rms maximise the present value (PV) of their net




= t (@Ut=@Ct) = (@U0=@C0). The cash inow is only the sales revenue P itSt, where P
i
t is
the sales price of producer i. While sales price is a choice variable, the purchase price PMt
is given for all agents, though P it = P
M
t for 8i in equilibrium. On the other hand, cash
outow is composed of the wage payment WtH
Mp
t , which is wage rate Wt times labour
hours HMpt , the expenditure on investment goods I
M
t (the price of F-goods is normalized




t , where Qt is the number of available
varieties, and PMt and M
M
t are the price and quantity indices of M-goods, respectively.








=MMt 1 also constitute M-rmscash outow. MH and
MM are both given parameters. These costs are evaluated in terms of F-goods. In sum,
the net cash inow is the sales revenue minus expenditure on labour, investment goods
and M-goods, as well as the adjustment costs.
The rst constraint is the evolution of unsold goods. The second represents the
stockout constraint; sales St is the minimum of GoSt or potential demand M
p
t . Note
thatMpt is the sum of the baseline demand and idiosyncratic shock in our notation. The
third constraint shows the production function, in which ZMt is exogenous shocks. The
production function takes capital KMt , labour H
Mp
t and M-goods M
M
t 1 as production
factors. The fourth constraint is the evolution of capital, in which we assume a quadratic
adjustment cost, where M and MK are given parameters.
B.2.2 F-rmsOptimization Problem









































KFt+1 = (1  F )KFt + IFt   FK(IFt   FKFt )2=KFt
The objective function again says that rms maximize the PV of their net cash in-





t refer to labour costs and expense on investment, respectively. The
production of nal goods Y Ft takes capital K
F
t , labour H
Fp
t and M-goods M
F
t 1 as pro-









=MFt 1 denote the adjustment costs of labour and M-goods, re-
spectively, in which FH and FM are given parameters.
The constraint represents the evolution of capital with the quadratic adjustment cost.
Note that, in this formulation, the level of capital in the steady state is not a¤ected by
the parameter FK , which governs the adjustment cost of investment.
B.2.3 Functional Form
We assume a CES production function with a Hicks-neutral technology shock ZKt = Z
Kn
t .
For K = F;M ,




























where K is the share parameter of the value-added component and K is the elasticity
of substitution between the value-added component and M-goods as inputs. The value-
added component V Kt is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas function, in which the share of
capital is K .Parameters K , K and K are exogenous.
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C Analytical Results
This section summarises the analytical results (see also Section 3 in the main text).
C.1 Equilibrium
There are 26 endogenous variables and 26 equations (excluding the law of motions of





MFt 1) are merely lagged variables and their denitions due to the adjustment costs.
With proper initial and terminal conditions, these equations dene the equilibrium.
Omitting lagged variables and their denition equations, this subsection summarises
the 22 equations. See Table 2 on page 24 for the list of variables used.
































































































































(1  )Pr+t+1P it+1 + Pr t+1Mt+1 + c1
	#
(10e)
where Pr+t  Prt= (1  Prt) and Pr t  (1  Prt) = (1  Prt) (10f)

























KMt+1 = (1  M)KMt + IMt   MK(IMt   MKMt )2=KMt (10i)
Ut+1 = Ut   St + Y Mt (10j)




































































































KFt+1 = (1  F )KFt + IFt   FK(IFt   FKFt )2=KFt (11f)
Two equations are the market clearing conditions for labour and F-goods. Because
all adjustment costs other than investments are measured in terms of F-goods, they are





























Three equations are derived from the specication of the idiosyncratic shock (6).


































































Figure 12: Comparison between a nancial option and inventories.
In a sense, (13) is the alternative to the market clearing condition of (the index of)
intermediate goods. In the limit  ! 0 (i.e., no idiosyncratic shock), if  = 1 (all
products today can be sold in todays market), (13a) and (13c) show that Ut+1 = 0 (no











The last two equations show the law of motions of exogenous shocks. In the basic












where Mnt and 
Fn
t are iid innovations that follow proper normal distributions.
C.2 Inventories as Options to Sell
This subsection discusses the key trade-o¤ in the stockout model: the FOC with respect





P it   Mt













where Mt is the marginal cost of producing M-goods (Lagrange multiplier for the law of




t 1 is the stochastic discount factor, P
i
t   Mt
is the marginal prot margin (P it is the sales price of seller i), and Pr [GoSt < M
p
t ] =
@E [St] =@Ut 1 is the stockout probability from the viewpoint of individual sellers. This
equation states that the carrying cost of one additional unit of inventory (RHS) is equal
to the expected value of the marginal cost of the lost sales opportunity (LHS).





P it Pr [GoSt < M
p
t ] + 
M






Note that the inside of the curly bracket shows the gross return on having one more unit
of unsold goods.
It is important to note that the expression Pr[GoSt < M
p
t ] is essentially equivalent to
an "option delta" in nance;56 having one more unit of inventory means having an option
to sell one more unit (see Figure 12). In this sense, inventories have a feature similar
to options on nancial assets. While an option delta is dened as the sensitivity of the
option price to a change in the underlying stock price in nance, (P it Mt ) Pr[GoSt < Dpt ]
56Remember that the delta of a call option is
c = 











where s is the log of the underlying stock price today, k is the strike price of the option, r is the (constant)
risk-free rate,  is the time to maturity,  is the volatility and  is a (standard normal) distribution
function. (One way to understand the term 
p
=2 is Jensens inequality. The Black-Scholes model
assumes a log-normal, rather than normal, distribution for stock price.)
We can see the following correspondences: value of holding inventories (value of option), derivative
of the expected prot w.r.t. inventories (option delta), and demand change (price change of underlying
stock) relative to the inventory holdings (strike price). The correspondence of (PMt  Mt ) is always 1 in
the case of a call option, because a 1-pound increase in stock price trivially leads to a 1-pound increase
in payo¤, if the stock price at the exercise date is higher than the strike price. Remember that, if the
potential demand is less than goods on shelf, 1 unit of increase in the potential demand leads to an
increase in prot by (PMt   Mt ).
Related to the importance of the CRS assumption, note that, ignoring the e¤ect of Jensens inequality,
s+ r represents the expected stock price at the exercise date under the equivalent martingale measure
(in the risk neutral world, the stock price must grow at the same rate as the risk free rate); hence, the
option delta can be regarded as the probability that the stock price exceeds the strike price under the risk
neutral measure. The real world probability measure should be changed to the equivalent martingale
measure because investors are risk averse. However, such a change of measure is not necessary in our
model, because, roughly speaking, our CRS assumption (with some other technical assumptions) implies
that sellers are risk neutral. So we can use risk neutral pricing without changing the measure.
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is the sensitivity of prot to a change of GoSt.57
C.3 Search Externalities
There are search externalities in M-markets.
On the buyersside, each buyer ignores the negative e¤ect of congestion. Intuitively,
if buyers buy more, then available varieties (Qt = Pr [can buy]) become fewer because
stockouts arise more often, but innitesimal buyers ignore such an e¤ect. In our model,















However, if there were, say, a strong union of purchasing managers, which coordinated

























which implies that the social cost (RHS of (19)) is larger than the private cost (RHS






















min fGoSt;Mpt g j~
t
i







min fGoSt;Mpt g j~
t
i
= Pr [GoSt > M
p
t ]
it is clear that (16) is equivalent to
Pr [GoSt < M
p
t ] = 1  Pr [GoSt > Mpt ] (17)
Thus, the rst derivative of the expected sales w.r.t. unsold goods means one minus a decrease in
the expected sales due to an increase in the underlying demand. Here, in the equation (17) "one"
means that, without the stockout constraint, one unit of increase in demand would trivially lead to
one unit of increase in sales, but, due to the second term (@E[min fGoSt;Mpt g j~
t]=@M it = e¤ect of the
probability of stockout), the incremental expected sales must be smaller than they would be without
the constraint. Therefore, we can restate our claim more precisely; the rst derivative of sales with
respect to inventories means a reduction in the loss of sales opportunity by holding one more unit of
inventories.
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of (18)). The additional term shows the e¤ect of congestion, which innitesimal buyers
ignore.
On the sellersside, if there were a powerful union of sellers which coordinated sellers,












































 0). When inventories are higher, the measure of varieties
that a buyer can enjoy is larger; hence the e¤ective cost is lower, which, in turn, stim-
ulates the demand for M-goods. However, such a mechanism is ignored. The second is







 0). As mentioned
in the previous subsection, when fewer varieties are available, the (physical unit of) po-
tential demand of one buyer becomes larger to achieve a certain level of the quantity
index. These two e¤ects o¤set one another; the net e¤ect may be positive or negative.
Nonetheless, some numerical experiments suggest that the overall e¤ect of the search
externalities seems to be very small.
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